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Abstract 
 
 
This paper analyzes wage differentials between male and female workers in the 
Spanish tourism industry, using a large, administratively matched employer-employee 
data set obtained from a representative sample of companies. This allows us to control 
for unobserved firm-specific factors likely to affect the magnitude of the gender wage 
gap. Our findings indicate that male workers earn on average 6.7% higher monthly 
wages than their socially comparable female counterparts. In particular, the type of 
contract held, the qualifications required for the job and the specific sub-sector of 
employment are very important variables in explaining this gender wage difference. 
We also find that only around 12% of the mean wage difference in the tourism 
industry cannot be explained by differences in observable characteristics, which is well 
below the average for the rest of the industries in Spain (87%). Our interpretation is 
that minimum wage legislation provides a particularly effective protection to women 
in the tourism industry, which is characterized by a large number of low-wage earners. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the early 1960s, tourism has become the principal engine of growth in the 
services sector in Spain. It has played a key role both as an income generator and as a 
source of employment, growing at twice as much as the national Gross Domestic 
Product growth rate. According to the Spanish Labour Force Survey (LFS)—a 
quarterly, continuous, sample-based survey directed at households and produced by 
the National Statistics Institute—the employees in tourism accounted for 12% of the 
working population at the national level and 19% of services employees in 2003. 
Despite this, tourism employment has not yet been the subject of widespread academic 
analysis in Spain, in contrast to other countries with a comparable standard of living. 
More specifically, previous research has largely neglected issues of gender wage 
differentials. This paper focuses on the factors that contribute to wage differences 
between male and female workers in the Spanish tourism industry when compared to 
other industries. The Spanish case is of interest because tourism jobs are often 
perceived as (a) requiring low levels of entry qualification, and (b) paying low wages. 
Thus it is not surprising if employment in this industry generally does not enjoy high 
status. Our results are useful for understanding how well labour markets work in 
tourism and non-tourism industries, and for understanding gender inequality.  
For this purpose, we use a large, administratively matched employer-employee data set 
that contains a representative sample of companies in Spain. The data set collects data 
on the monthly wages of workers employed in these companies during a 6-year 
interval (from 1998 to 2003). This data set is uniquely suited to explaining wage 
differences among workers hired by the same company, since it includes the individual 
labour history of every worker hired by the sample companies. No other data set in 
Spain currently meets this criterion. Without it, gathering comparable data from every 
worker hired by a representative sample of companies in this country simply would not 
have been feasible.  
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Our work is mainly descriptive. We establish the main features of the wage gap, its 
decomposition, and trace some underlying patterns (e.g., which groups of women face 
particularly small or large wage differentials). Economists have many theories of why 
women are paid less than men (see, for example, Cain, 1986). While we do find that 
female workers in tourism (and non-tourism) industries are paid less than men, our 
findings have no particular bearing on the validity of the various theories. Moreover, 
the wage difference alone may not accurately reflect the women’s economic well-
being relative to men. With all these limitations in mind, we take the modest first step 
of documenting the female earnings gap in the Spanish tourism industry. 
Our main findings indicate that male workers in tourism earn on average around 6.7% 
higher monthly wages than their socially comparable female counterparts (for non-
tourism workers this gap is 4.81%). Among tourism workers, most of this gap is due to 
the type of contract held, the qualifications required for the job and the specific sub-
sector of employment. In addition, our decomposition results reveal that only 12% of 
the gender wage gap in tourism can be attributed to gender-specific differences in 
returns to market skills (while for non-tourism workers this proportion rises to 
87.49%). We therefore conclude that even though the gender wage gap is slightly 
wider among tourism workers than among non-tourism workers, minimum wage 
legislation in Spain (introduced in 1964) provides a more effective protection to 
women in the tourism industry, which is characterized by a higher proportion of low-
wage earners. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
main characteristics of the labour market in Spain. Section 3 provides a survey of the 
relevant literature on the gender wage gap in tourism industries. Section 4 takes a first 
descriptive look at the data. Section 5 presents the econometric model, and Section 6 
presents the empirical results. Finally, Section 7 contains concluding remarks. 
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2. A brief overview of the structural characteristics of the labour market in Spain  
From the late 1970s to the end of the 1990s, the Spanish economy was affected by 
mass unemployment and an inflation differential with the rest of the European Union 
(EU). Economists generally agreed that the malfunctioning labour market was to 
blame for Spain’s high level of unemployment, and this consensus prompted a series 
of reforms (beginning in the 1980s) aimed at reducing dismissal costs, limiting the use 
of temporary contracts and increasing the incentives for firms to hire workers from 
certain population groups using open-ended contracts. Although the economy 
generally improved from the late 1990s
2
, the evidence suggests that the labour reforms 
have done little to reduce the proportion of temporary employment: despite the 
government’s best efforts, only one in three contracts is permanent. As a result, Spain 
has the largest proportion of fixed-term contracts in Europe. This widespread use of 
fixed-term contracts may affect the gender wage gap if fixed-term contracts have 
uneven effects on the pay structures of men and women (Amuedo-Dorantes & De la 
Rica, 2006). Indeed, the unions point to this high rate of temporary employment and an 
insufficient fall in unemployment as the main problems of the Spanish labour market. 
They have particularly affected women, even though there has been an increase in 
women’s activity rates during the last two decades (de la Rica et al., 2008). As a result, 
Spain has one of the poorest records among the advanced economies for incorporating 
women into its labour force.  
Over the last four decades the structure of employment in Spain has gradually 
approached that of the advanced European economies. The agricultural workforce 
declined sharply, down to under 1 million in the late 1990s from 4 million 30 years 
earlier. Restructuring and technological change have contributed to cutting the number 
of jobs in the secondary sector. The employment haemorrhage was most acute in “old” 
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 The employment rate increased by 2-7% after 1995, reaching 42.46% in 1999 according to the Labour 
Force Survey. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate fell by 3.9%, reaching 15.90% in 1999, and the 
activity rate increased by 1%, reaching 50.29% in 1999. 
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industries such as textiles, steel, shipbuilding and engineering (Castro et al., 1999). 
The exception to the overall drop in employment has been the services sector. This 
sector has benefited from the continued prominence of Spain as a major world tourist 
destination, state sponsorship of the welfare state, and a boom in administrative jobs. 
As regards women, female employment is concentrated in two main areas: 
manufacturing (primarily in the textile, leather and footwear industries) and services 
(retailing, hotels, education and domestic service). Typically, in industries in which 
women constitute the majority the jobs are part-time, low paid and insecure. 
Consequently, as the female participation rate has risen
3
, unemployment has become 
increasingly “feminized” (Threlfall, 2000).  
Finally, inequalities exist in pay rates between men and women (Corkhill, 2004). 
Although the Workers’ Charter was amended in the 1990s to secure the principle of 
equal pay for women—employers are legally obliged to pay the same wage for equal 
work, with no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex—much remains to be 
achieved with regard to equality of opportunity, particularly childcare provision and 
other measures to reconcile family life (Threlfall, 2000).  
3. Gender pay differences in tourism employment  
The use of the term tourism employment needs some clarification, as tourism is not a 
recognized industry in the Standard Industrial Classification, and most countries’ 
national accounts do not list tourism as a separate entity (Cooper et al., 1993). This is 
because while tourism contains a wide variety of businesses, it is not an industry in the 
traditional sense of the word. So it does not fit the standard criteria for (national) 
accounts
4
. In our definition of the tourism industry from a supply-side perspective, the 
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 There has been a steady growth in Spanish female participation from 27% in 1985 to 46.95% in 2005, 
according to the LFS. This is, however, well below the average female participation rate in the EU in 
2005 (56.3%). 
4
 In most statistical systems, the best approximation we can get on tourism (and especially on tourism 
employment) is obtained from the restaurant and catering entry. This is due to the fact that tourism is 
seen as an industry dominated by the hospitality sector. But tourism is a multi-product industry with 
strong links to other economic sectors (Diamond, 1977). 
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classification according to the industry (i.e., the main economic activity of the 
company) will be used (see next section)
5
.  
The gap between the average pay of men and women in all industrialized countries is 
perhaps the clearest indication of the inequality that is a universal feature of female 
employment (Doherty & Stead, 1998). For the tourism industry, Kinnaird & Hall 
(1994), Wilkinson & Pratiwi (1995), and Sinclair (1997) establish the conceptual 
framework for analyzing gender issues in tourism. These authors note the scarce 
literature on gender wage differences in this industry in the 1990s, despite the fact that 
tourism is an important source of employment in some countries. While to our 
knowledge there are no empirical studies on this issue in Spain
6
, gender wage 
differences in tourism employment have been analyzed in different settings at the 
international level after the year 2000. Apart from pure gender discrimination—for 
instance, in the United States Sparrow & Iverson (1999), after taking into account the 
effect of legitimate causes (such as human capital), find persistence in gender-based 
income disparity in the hospitality industry—explanations for the existence of 
differential earnings between men and women include occupational segregation, the 
concentration of low pay in certain industries, and human capital theory. 
As regards occupational segregation, previous studies have offered evidence to suggest 
that women’s employment is both horizontally and vertically segregated, with the 
majority of female workers located in subordinate posts, receiving lower levels of 
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 Defining tourism from a supply-side perspective is somehow problematic, since tourists spend money 
on a variety of products and services and so tourism cuts through the normal classification of industries. 
However, defining tourism from a demand-side perspective would only provide insight into the number 
of jobs in the tourism industry, not into the characteristics of the labour force. To say something about 
these characteristics (wages, immigrant status, age, etc.) some kind of supply-side approach must be 
used. 
6
 In Spain, interest in wage differences by gender is a result of the relatively recent rise in female labour 
force participation rates (as indicated in Section 2). Recent studies in this area for the whole Spanish 
economy include Amuedo & De la Rica (2006), Caparros et al. (2004), De la Rica et al. (2008), De la 
Rica & Ugidos (1995), Dolado et al. (2004), García et al. (2001), Gardeazábal & Ugidos (2005) and 
Hernández (1995, 1996).  
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remuneration (Richter, 1995; Groshen, 1991; Sorensen, 1989)
7
. The tourism industry 
also segregates women into areas of employment that commercialize their perceived 
domestic skills and “feminine” characteristics (Enloc, 1989; Kinnaird, Kothari & Hall, 
1994). For instance, Delfim & Varejao (2007) find evidence of vertical segregation in 
the tourism industry in Portugal. Women do hold some managerial positions in the 
tourism industry, but typically even these posts are gender segregated (Skalpe, 2007).  
A second explanation for gender-based differences concerns the structural 
concentration of low pay in certain industries. Rubery & Fagan (1994) draw together 
evidence from all EU member states to show that women are more vulnerable to low 
pay than men. This is not only because of women’s occupational segregation within 
industries and their propensity to experience part-time or home working (see below), 
but also because of their tendency to work in low-paying industries. Broadly speaking, 
tourism pay is relatively low (Riley, Ladkin & Szivas, 2002)—wage levels are 
generally 20% below the EU average, and even when enhanced rates for overtime 
exist, they may be rarely paid (Royle, 1999)
8
. This lower level of pay relative to other 
industries is likely to be so not only because human capital requirements are low in 
tourism (relative to other industries), and the skills required are easily acquired (Riley 
& Szivas, 2003). In addition, tourism workers are unlikely to be able to use 
organization-specific human capital to improve earnings by staying on to take 
advantage of the organization’s need to keep them for their acquired specific skills 
(Mincer & Jovanovic, 1981). Two reasons may explain this. On the one hand, 
employers pay less for a job where tenure will be short because of the consequent 
learning and advancement process. Rosen (1972) points out that the capacity of a job 
to teach has a downward effect on the rate of pay. He argues that certain jobs are seen 
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 Stockdale (1991) defines this segregation as follows: “The jobs that women do are different from those 
done by men (horizontal segregation) and women work at lower levels than men in the occupational 
hierarchy (vertical segregation)”. 
8
 Working conditions in the EU tourism industry include potentially problematic areas such as irregular 
working hours, frequent Sunday working, wages without a fixed element in 25% of cases, and 
widespread absence of overtime premiums. 
 8 
as opportunities to learn and thus employers assume short tenure and offer a rate that 
represents the role the job is playing in a recognized career progression. On the other 
hand, productivity in tourism is not strongly related to job tenure—as a result of the 
fact that the skills required are easily acquired (i.e., there is little incentive/reward 
structure). Many of these low-paid occupations in tourism are conspicuously populated 
by women and intra-occupational differentials often favour men (Sparrow & Iverson, 
1989). In any case, the fact that high proportions of the occupants of these low-paid 
jobs are women does not cause the level of pay, thus tempering the discrimination 
argument and pointing the finger at the nature of the jobs (Murgatroyd, 1982). 
Gender-based differences caused by occupational segregation and the concentration of 
low pay in tourism industries are evidence of structural factors beyond the control of 
the individual. In contrast, according to the third explanation for gender-based 
differences—human capital theory—education leads to greater productivity in the 
workforce, and so increases the market value of labour (Becker, 1962), because 
education provides the workers with skills that their employers value. As a result, an 
individual’s pay is primarily attributable to acquired education and experience. The 
implication is that—contrary to what happens in the other two explanations—women 
can and should obtain more education and experience to achieve income parity with 
men. However, women accumulate less human capital (education, training, 
experience) than men because they spend fewer years in the labour force—women 
allocate a greater proportion of their time to raising children—and have different 
expectations of market participation than men (Mincer & Polachek, 1974)
9
. Thus the 
choices and preferences of women may also explain occupational segregation: women 
choose jobs that require less human capital because they believe they will spend fewer 
years in the labour market than men. In turn, employers assume that women will have 
a lower degree of attachment to the firm than men, and prefer to train and promote 
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 Further evidence suggests a close connection between career interruptions and earnings growth for 
women (Corcoran & Duncan, 1979; Cox, 1984; Joshi, 1984; Mincer & Ofek, 1982). 
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male workers who work continuously. Hence productivity differentials between men 
and women appear and their pay may merely reflect this.  
4. A first look at the data 
 
The estimation of wage equations requires worker-level data. To control for both 
worker and workplace characteristics matched employer-employee data are also 
required. Thus we use a Spanish data set having these two properties. It was 
constructed from Social Security records as follows. The companies included are a 1-
percent representative random sample of the companies belonging to the General 
Regime of the Social Security system on 31 December 2000
10
. We have access to the 
6-year labour history in these companies—from 1998 to 2003—of the individuals who 
were employed by them from 31 December 2000 to 31 December 2003. This is the 
only data set in Spain where the labour history of every worker employed at these 
companies is available. This allows us to explain wage differences among workers 
employed at the same company by taking into account the panel-level variance 
component (see Section 5.1 below
11
). The data are not restricted to the tourism 
industry, but cover all the other industries too. They include firm characteristics such 
as industry, location and size (measured by the size of the workforce). For each 
worker, data is available on gender, age, date of admission to the firm, monthly wages, 
the type of contract held
12
, job tenure, the qualifications required for the job, and 
whether or not the individual is an immigrant. The following two limitations are worth 
noting. First, this data set does not include the educational level, which would measure 
the individuals’ human capital independent of their job. Because of this, the 
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 Registration with the Social Security is obligatory for all workers. Individuals are registered when 
they begin their working life and are included under one of the Social Security schemes.  There are three 
regimes: the “General Social Security Scheme” (Régimen General de la Seguridad Social, or RGSS), 
the “Special Social Security Schemes” (Regímenes Especiales de la Seguridad Social, or RESS), and 
the Government employees’ scheme (Régimen de Clases Pasivas, or RCP).  
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 As explained in sections 5.1 and 5.2, including firm effects allows us to isolate a part of the 
unexplained wage gap which might be due to variable omissions. 
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 See Table B in the Appendix for definitions of each type of temporary contract. For more details of 
each type of contract, see the Guía Laboral, elaborated by the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs, which is freely available from the following website: http://www.mtas.es. 
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qualification level is used as a proxy for the individual skill level (as it captures a mix 
of the occupation and the educational level required for the job). Second, the 
individual’s total experience in the labour market is missing, since the available data 
refer to the 6-year labour history at the companies included in the sample (as explained 
above)
13
. Thus we use age as a proxy for experience in the labour market. 
Observations with incomplete data were excluded from the data set. Although this data 
set does not contain information about hours of work—so it is impossible to compute 
hourly wages
14
—it is possible to distinguish between full-time and part-time workers 
through the type of contract variable. Thus we restrict the analysis to full-time 
employees between 16 and 65 years old (excluding the self-employed), which reduces 
sample heterogeneity. We identified the specific sub-sector where each worker is 
employed: (a) Hotels; (b) Camping sites and other commercial accommodation; (c) 
Restaurants, bars and canteens; (d) Transport, car hire, travel agencies, tour operators 
and tour guides; (e) Recreational, cultural and sporting facilities. The industries for 
non-tourism workers are shown in Table C in the Appendix. The whole sample was 
further divided by gender. Our sample selection criteria reduce the number of 
observations in the data set to 95,767 male and 77,379 female workers in tourism 
industries—1,016 and 953 companies, respectively—and to 130,850 male and 77,098 
female workers in non-tourism industries—6,512 and 5,007 companies, respectively. 
The variable of central interest is monthly wages from 1998 to 2003
15
. Since explicit 
information about hours of work is not available, the monthly Social Security 
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 As men and women are selected from the broader population (which includes those not working), 
sample selection issues arise when deriving the non-discriminatory wage structure. However, since the 
data set used has no information on people not working, it is not possible to correct for the non-random 
way in which individuals exercise their choice into paid employment. Thus the estimation of wage 
equations from samples of employed workers alone induces a sample selection bias. Not correcting for 
this selection bias may reduce the estimated gap (see Stanley & Jarrell, 1998). 
14
 Overtime work, however, is reflected in the Social Security contributions that are captured in the data 
set. In any case, a limitation would be encountered whenever differences between the real hours and the 
official hours exist. 
15
 Although June and December are usually peak periods (and wages are therefore characterized by 
seasonality), this does not apply to contributions to Social Security, since extraordinary payments are 
pro-rated in such contributions. As regards non-tourism workers, we keep only the wage corresponding 
to the month of June of each year, due to the large size of this sub-sample. 
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contributions (monthly wages, henceforth) are used as proxies (in constant 2003 
euros). As the General Social Security Scheme establishes upper and lower bounds for 
monthly wages, the wage variable is censored. For this reason, we use a generalization 
of Oaxaca-Blinder’s Decomposition Method in which censored data are taken into 
account (see Section 5.1 for a detailed description of this method). 
 [TABLE 1] 
Tables 1 and 2 present gender wage differences in the main variables used for both 
tourism and non-tourism sub-samples, respectively. These tables also show differences 
in mean monthly wages (i.e., the raw gap), their significance levels, as well as the 
female-male ratios of mean wages. Among (non-)tourism workers, the female-male 
wage ratio is 85.23% (86.29%), which means that women’s mean monthly wage is 
around 85 to 86% of men’s, with very little difference between the two sub-samples. 
The econometric estimations—to be discussed in detail in the following section—seek 
to explain this gender-group difference in wages (i.e., whether it differs across socio-
economic, demographic and labour market related characteristics, and how much can 
be attributed to these characteristics). As Tables 1 and 2 indicate, there are obvious 
reasons for undertaking such an analysis, since the characteristics of females are not 
identical to those of men. In addition, the t-statistics show that most average wage 
differences between the sexes are statistically significant at conventional levels.  
[TABLE 2] 
As the tables show, female-male wage ratios fall in older workers: older women face a 
wider earnings gap than younger women. Thus market discrimination against females 
may persist for the older groups (while it decreases for the younger groups). Moreover, 
both among tourism and non-tourism workers gender segregation exists across sub-
sectors. For instance, in tourism employment a higher proportion of women than men 
work in Hotels (49.89% versus 43.62%) and in Camping sites and other commercial 
accommodation (33.67% versus 23.98%), but the reverse is true in Restaurants (6.22% 
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versus 24.49%). Thus women are under-represented in the sub-sector where the 
highest wages are earned (Restaurants), and over-represented in the low-paid sectors 
(e.g., in Hotels and Camping sites and other commercial accommodation). As regards 
non-tourism workers, men are proportionately more present in Construction (30.52% 
versus 2.41%), and in Mining & industry (24.68% versus 16.84%), whereas the 
opposite happens in Retailing, Computing and Health & sanitation (see Table 2).  
Apart from industry segmentation, there exists evidence of vertical segmentation 
across qualification groups among tourism workers. A low level of qualifications is the 
hallmark characteristic of employment in this industry: the most important 
qualification level for males is semi-skilled clerks and skilled labourers (group 4), 
while that of females is semi-skilled and unskilled labourers (group 5)—Table A in the 
Appendix details the specific categories within each qualification group. Male workers 
are relatively more present in jobs requiring the highest qualification levels (where 
higher wages are earned: qualification groups 1 and 2): 10.97% of male employees 
belong to these two groups, compared to only 6.08% of women. Among non-tourism 
workers, in contrast, the reverse is true (see Table 2).  
While most tourism workers work in firms with less than or equal to 25 employees, 
female non-tourism workers work predominantly in firms with more than 100 workers. 
However, firm size is not markedly different between the sexes. Similarly, the 
distribution of tenure at the current job is rather similar across genders. But the 
proportion of contracts signed for less than one year is higher among tourism 
employees than among non-tourism workers. This suggests that employer-employee 
relationships are less stable in tourism than elsewhere in the economy. This instability 
is, however, not reflected in the type of contract, since the proportion of individuals 
hired under open-ended contracts is on average higher among tourism workers than 
among non-tourism workers. This may be attributed to the existence of a special type 
of open-ended contract called ‘discontinuous open-ended contract’ (in Spanish, 
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contrato fijo discontinuo), which allows for interruptions of the labour relation due to 
seasonality. These interruptions (typically, in autumn and winter) are covered either by 
working elsewhere (for example, in construction) or by receiving unemployment 
benefit. In other words, when each tourist season ends, workers hired under 
discontinuous open-ended contracts may be laid off, but they expect an implicit re-call 
by the same firm in the following tourist season. Finally, among temporary contracts, 
the casual (Per-task) contract is the most widespread among (non-)tourism workers. 
[FIGURE 1] 
Figures 1 and 2 show empirical density functions (estimated using kernel density 
estimates) by gender, for tourism and non-tourism workers, respectively. The figures 
show that the wage distribution of male workers is more skewed to the right than that 
of female employees. Thus more men than women are breaking into the highest-
paying jobs. The percentage of men and women whose log earnings are more than one 
standard deviation above the overall mean log earnings in tourism is 26.61% and 
13.78%, respectively. The figures for non-tourism workers are 22.46% and 14.47%, 
respectively. Thus as expected, substantially more men than women are in this high-
earnings group in both sub-samples. 
[FIGURE 2] 
5. Econometric methodology 
 
5.1 A two-limit tobit model 
 
The observed dependent variable wage, denoted by y, is censored both from below (at 
the minimum threshold) and from above (at the maximum threshold). To account for 
repeated observations of the same firms at different times and for censoring, a two-
limit random-effects tobit model (Rosett & Nelson, 1975) is used, and specified as 
follows
16
: 
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 Using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on censored data is inappropriate. It results in biased 
and inconsistent estimates because the standard OLS assumption that the error term and the independent 
variables are uncorrelated is violated (Maddala, 1983). On the other hand, a fixed-effects model, in 
which unmeasured company- and/or time-specific influences are treated as constants rather than random 
 14 










≥
≤+=
≤
=
UitU
ULititit
LitL
it
yif
ifxy
yif
y
ττ
ττεβ
ττ
*
*
*
     (1) 
 
where y* is the latent (index) variable, τl is the threshold of left-censoring and τu the 
threshold of right-censoring. Each company is denoted by i, and each monthly 
observation by t. A vector of explanatory variables is referred to as x, whereas β is its 
associated vector of coefficients. The error is denoted by εit. As the data are 
longitudinal, the model has a random-effects specification, which rests on the 
assumption that the distribution function of the errors is independent of the 
explanatory variables—i.e., the unobservable factors are not correlated with the 
explanatory variables (Arellano & Honoré, 1999)
17
. In this model, the error is specified 
as the sum of transitory and permanent components as follows:  
ititit uv +=ε       (2) 
The transitory error component (vit) captures unmeasured influences that vary over 
companies and time, while the permanent error component (uit) captures unmeasured 
influences that vary over companies but persist through time. Both these components 
are assumed to be normally distributed with zero means and independent of each other, 
so that: 
[ ] 22 uvitVar σσε +=      (3) 
 
where the parameter σu is the standard deviation of the error part related to unobserved 
corporate heterogeneity. We control for unobserved firm-specific factors likely to 
affect the magnitude of the gender wage gap (Meng, 2004; Meng & Meurs, 2004). For 
                                                                                                                                             
variables, represents an alternative to variance components. This approach was not pursued because no 
consistent estimator exists for fixed-effects tobit models (Maddala, 1987). 
17
 Likelihood-ratio tests for the pooled estimator against random-effects panel estimator indicate that the 
panel-level variance component is important and hence the pooled estimations are different from the 
panel estimations (see Tables C and 3). The reported coefficient of ρ, which is the panel-level variance 
component, provides a similar test. It represents the proportion of the total variance contributed by the 
panel-level variance component. As the tables show, the estimated value of ρ in all regressions is 
significant. 
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instance, low pay is usually linked to a wide range of factors, many of which are 
specific to the establishment—for example, low pay is frequent in single 
establishments and rarer in small establishments that are part of a larger organization 
(McNabb & Whitfield, 2000)—and its competitive strategy (which is immeasurable). 
Also unobserved are the reasons why in certain companies females tend to get jobs 
with less training attached (and consequently have fewer opportunities to participate in 
on-the-job training to improve their productivity throughout their life). The standard 
deviation of vit is also estimated, as is the case in all tobit models. 
 
If y
*
 can be assumed normally distributed, the tobit model will provide consistent and 
efficient estimates of parameters. Maximum likelihood estimation for the model 
involves dividing the observations into three sets. One contains uncensored 
observations, which maximum likelihood treats in the same way as the linear 
regression model. The other two contain left-censored and right-censored observations, 
respectively, for which the specific value of y
*
 is not known. The probability of being 
left-censored is computed as: 
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and the probability of being right-censored as: 
 
( ) 




 −Φ=




 −Φ−=≥
σ
τβ
σ
βτ
τ UUU
xx
xy 1Pr *    (5) 
 
The likelihood function for all three sets of observations is then: 
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1
lnlnln   (6) 
 
where φ  and Ф are the probability density and the cumulative density functions, 
respectively, for the standard normal distribution, and σ is the standard deviation of ε. 
Expected values for the latent outcome, E(y
*
|x)=xβ, are the primary focus of interest.
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5.2 Oaxaca’s approach to estimating wage discrimination 
 
As is standard in the empirical literature on between-group comparison of wages, we 
determine how much of any wage differential is due to differences in characteristics 
and how much is due to coefficient differences (i.e., differences in the returns to the 
characteristics). The standard interpretation of unexplained wage differentials (i.e. 
differences in wages that remain after having controlled for socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics) is that there is discrimination (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 
1973). However, it must be stressed that the unexplained part of the gender wage gap 
may be due to factors other than discrimination—in this sense, since the data set 
includes repeated observations of the same firms at different times, this allows us to 
isolate a part of the unexplained wage gap which might be due to variable omissions. 
Part of the unexplained gap may be due to variables that are not included in the model. 
For instance, intensity of effort is a very important variable explaining wages, but this 
variable is absent from almost all data sets because it is very difficult to observe and 
measure. Thus caution should be exercised when interpreting the unexplained part of 
the gender wage gap as labour market discrimination: it can in principle be related to 
anything that is not associated with the observable characteristics. 
Let )ln( my  and )ln( fy  be the natural logs of mean male and female wages. If the log 
wage model of the previous section is estimated separately for male and female 
workers, then: 
ffmmfm XXyy ββ ˆˆ)ln()ln( −=−     (7) 
where mX and fX  are vectors containing the means of the variables for male and 
female workers, respectively, and mβˆ  and fβˆ  are the estimated coefficients. Given 
this result, the log wage differential can be decomposed in two ways. Letting 
''' fm XXX −=∆ , and fm βββ ˆˆˆ −=∆ , (7) can be written as: 
ββ ∆+∆=− fmfm XXyy ')ln()ln(     (8) 
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or 
ββ ∆+∆=− mffm XXyy ')ln()ln(     (9) 
The expression to the left of the equals sign in (8) (the “explained” part) is the part of 
the log wage differential due to different (average) characteristics when evaluated at 
men’s returns. The expression on the right (the “unexplained” part) measures the 
differences in returns when evaluated at women’s mean level of characteristics. This 
expression indicates the amount by which women’s mean (logarithmic) wages would 
change for a given variable category if women were to receive men’s estimated return 
to that characteristic (while retaining their own mean level of that characteristic). The 
alternative formulation in equation (9) reverses the weighting system, so that the 
differences in returns are weighted by working men’s, rather than women’s, mean 
level of characteristics. If in the absence of discrimination males and females received 
identical returns for the same characteristics—and differences in wages would 
therefore be due only to differences in pay-related characteristics—then the expression 
to the right of the equals sign in (8) and (9) can be interpreted as the part of the log 
wage differential due to discrimination. The question arises as to which of the two 
equations (8) or (9) to use in empirical work. If it is assumed that in the absence of 
discrimination the current male (female) wage structure would prevail, then the 
decomposition in equation 8 (9) would prevail. Given that these two equations might 
yield different decompositions (Neumark, 1988), we estimate gender wage 
differentials based on these two Oaxaca decompositions, as well as on an alternative 
decomposition where we use fm βββ ˆ*5.0ˆ*5.0ˆ +=  as the non-discrimination wage 
structure (see Reimers, 1983). 
6. Results 
Table 3 shows the estimated results for the male and female tourism sub-samples, 
since it is essential to allow the intercept as well as the returns to each of the 
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explanatory variables to vary between gender groups
18
. Most variables are 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level and their estimated coefficients are 
consistent in general with a priori expectations
19
.  
[TABLE 3] 
As the table shows, younger workers (especially those under 30 years old) earn 
significantly lower monthly wages than workers above 45. Other things equal, both 
men and women temporarily hired via temporary help agencies earn higher wages than 
their non-agency counterparts. Immigrants earn lower wages than their native 
counterparts, although this result is only significant for females (male immigrants do 
not earn significantly different wages from natives). Note also that job tenure is only a 
marginally significant variable for males: men earn lower wages when tenure is below 
six months, whereas the largest return to tenure is achieved for tenure between 1 and 2 
years. No significant differences arise in the rest of the tenure categories (this may be 
attributed, as explained in Section 3 above, to the fact that in tourism there is generally 
little incentive/reward structure). 
An important factor in pay is the qualification level required for the job. Qualification 
is highly positively correlated with wages, both for males and females (as expected). In 
addition, male employees in Camping sites and other commercial accommodation earn 
the highest wages, followed by the Hotel sub-industry. In contrast, women employed 
in Transportation, car hire, travel agencies, tour operators and tour guides earn the 
highest wages, while those employed in Recreational, cultural and sporting facilities 
earn the lowest wages. 
                                                 
18
 For the sake of comparison, wage equations for non-tourism industries were also estimated. These 
results are presented in Table C in the Appendix and are used to produce the wage decomposition 
shown in the lower part of Table 4.  
19
 Skewness and kurtosis tests for the normality of the dependent variable (not shown) indicate that non-
normality must be accepted. This limitation is attenuated, however, by the fact that the estimations are 
done in large samples. 
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With regard to firm size, the industrial structure in tourism usually has a dual 
character, with some examples of large organizations (e.g., resorts or airports) and 
many geographically-fragmented small concentrations (such as hotels, restaurants, 
visitor attraction centres or car rental offices). Large companies, because of the 
opportunities for advancement they offer, attract better, more productive workers 
(Evans & Leighton, 1989), which creates pay differentials
20
. As expected, both men 
and women employed in firms with more than 100 employees earn higher wages than 
workers employed in smaller companies. In fact, the larger the size of the firm, the 
higher the monthly wages. Finally, the type of contract is a very significant variable in 
explaining wages. Both males and females holding interim contracts enjoy the highest 
wages, closely followed by individuals with open-ended contracts.  
[TABLE 4] 
The results in Table 3 show marked differences between men and women in the 
estimated coefficients for several variables. However, as Table 1 shows, each sub-
sample differs in the average endowment of productivity characteristics and these 
differences may explain the observed wage gaps discussed in Section 4. Oaxaca (1973) 
offers a convenient decomposition of the observed wage gap into a portion attributable 
to differences in the average value of variables (the explained part) and a portion 
attributable to differences in the compensation for productivity characteristics (the 
unexplained part)—as explained in Section 5.2 above. Table 4 presents the wage 
decomposition results. Three representations of the estimated non-discriminatory wage 
structure were used. First, we use the estimated male wage structure as the non-
discriminatory norm for the Oaxaca-1 approach. The Oaxaca-2 approach assumes that 
there is no discrimination against female employees. Finally, the algorithm by Reimers 
(1983) is used. The estimated difference in the mean log wage between male and 
                                                 
20
 In addition, large firms are more likely to have adopted strong anti-discrimination policies in response 
to both public scrutiny and government sanction. 
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female tourism employees is 0.065 (0.047 for non-tourism employees). Thus when 
account is taken of gender wage differences in the regressors, the average male earns 
6.71% (4.81%) higher wages than the average female in (non-) tourism—these 
percentage figures are calculated as (e
0.065
-1)*100 and (e
0.047
-1)*100, respectively, 
since the exponent of a difference in logarithms is approximately equal to a percentage 
difference.  
Focusing on the Reimers results, our calculation shows that differences in 
characteristics between men and women (the so-called endowment effect) account for 
88% of the total wage gap in tourism (the magnitude of this effect is 0.058)—a far 
larger share than they are able to explain for the rest of the economy (where the 
endowment effect amounts to 0.006, or 12.5% of the total wage gap). Thus in tourism 
only 12% of the wage gap is unexplained by these characteristics. In other words, 
women working in tourism would earn 12% more in the absence of differences in the 
wage structures
21
. Thus this percentage may be interpreted either as gender wage 
discrimination or as the result of some un-measurable traits—henceforth, we label this 
component the “discrimination” component. The discrimination component for 
tourism industries in Spain found here is lower than that found for other countries. For 
instance, Delfim & Varejao (2007) find that 55% of the gender wage gap in the 
Portuguese tourism industry is due to discrimination.  
The negative explained components associated with being an immigrant and agency 
hiring means that these characteristics favour the relative wage pattern of women. 
However, the cumulative contribution to the explained part (0.058) of the gender wage 
gap emanating from these variables (as well as from age, job tenure and firm size) is 
rather small, and is totally offset by the rest of the components in Table 4. 
                                                 
21
 The Oaxaca-2 decomposition for tourism workers is the only one which reveals that the unexplained 
component serves to reduce rather than widen the gap (see Table 4). 
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In contrast, around 50% of the total wage gap in tourism industries is due to the type of 
contract held, followed by the level of qualification (37.75%) and the sub-sector of 
employment (17.84%). One can see why the explained wage differential due to 
differences in the type of contract is rather large. The male distribution (Table 1) is 
less concentrated on the Work experience and training contract category (0.17% 
versus 0.38%), and on the Per-task category (9.84% versus 11.78%), but substantially 
more concentrated on the Open-ended category (60.61% versus 49.49%). Since 
individuals hired under the first two types of contracts earn lower wages, and at the 
same time those holding Open-ended contracts earn higher wages (see Table 3), the 
resulting wage differential attributed to the type of contract is large. Analogously, and 
as mentioned in Section 4 above, men are more present than women in tourism jobs 
requiring relatively high qualification levels (where the highest wages are earned, 
according to the estimation results in Table 3). Thus considerable segregation exists 
across occupational levels within the industry. As regards the proportion of the gap 
due to differences in the sub-sector of employment, men have comparatively more 
weight in Restaurants, where wages are higher (Table 1). Thus although females are 
more likely to be employed in Hotels and Transport, car hire, travel agencies, tour 
operators & tour guides—where wages are higher than in the reference category (i.e., 
Recreational, cultural and sporting facilities)—either their relative presence in these 
sub-sectors or their market rewards are not enough to countervail the wage differential 
favourable to males. In essence, the large share of women in occupations with lower 
rewards has important adverse effects on women’s pay. If these are unconstrained 
choices, then the explained portion of the gap stands, but it is rather likely to include 
some degree of industrial, qualification or contractual “discrimination”.  
Our results provide evidence of a significant disparity in wages to the detriment of 
women in non-tourism industries that cannot be attributed to differences in observable 
variables: among non-tourism workers, the component attributed to unobserved 
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characteristics (87.49%) is substantially larger than the one for tourism workers. This 
figure is slightly larger than the one found in prior studies on discrimination studies—
e.g., Weichselbaumer & Winter-Ebmer (2003) find that the discrimination component 
tends to amount to roughly 60%—but lies inside the wide range of variation in 
reported wage gap estimates in previous literature—Stanley & Jarrell (1998) find 
variations from -2.7% to 91% with a mean of 31.8%. Thus with the data available 
most of the overall gender wage gap among non-tourism workers cannot be explained 
by the differences in productivity endowments. 
7. Conclusion and implications 
In this paper we analyze the gender wage gap of full-time employees in the Spanish 
tourism industry. Because very scarce matching evidence is available for other tourism 
labour markets, we also compare the extent of gender pay differences in the Spanish 
tourism industry with what occurs in the rest of the economy. To do this, we use a 
large employer-employee data set from the Social Security records that allows us to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, and specify monthly wages as a 
function of socio-economic, demographic and labour market characteristics.  
We find that in tourism male workers earn on average 6.7% higher monthly wages 
than their socially comparable female counterparts, while among non-tourism workers 
the predicted gender wage gap is slightly narrower (4.8%). In addition, the wage gap in 
tourism is due to segregation as regards the type of contract held, the qualification 
required for the job and the sub-sector of employment: these three variables are 
especially penalizing for women. An intriguing question is to ask about the reasons for 
the segregation, since it may be due either to choice or to entry barriers. In any case, 
our results suggest that in Spain the gender wage gap is a matter of employment 
opportunities and firms’ decision to offer equal pay for equal work or not. 
One of the main questions is how much of the wage gap can be attributed to 
discrimination. Our findings provide evidence that the disparity in wages suffered by 
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women cannot be attributed fully to differences in observable characteristics. Despite 
taking into account a wide variety of explanatory variables, in tourism the unexplained 
component accounts for approximately 12% of the overall gender wage differential. 
This unobserved component is substantially lower that the one observed for non-
tourism employees (87.49%). Our explanation for this difference is that men have been 
incumbents in some of the non-tourism industries for many years. Thus initiatives in 
which companies in these industries recruit, hire, promote and remunerate women on 
an equal standing with men cannot transform the structure of earnings overnight. 
Our results also suggest that the minimum wage legislation in Spain provides effective 
protection to female low-wage earners in tourism industries. Although minimum 
wages are set for all occupations and economic sectors, they have a particularly strong 
impact in low-wage industries where a larger share of workers is covered by the 
legislation. In Spain, indeed, around 81.3% of minimum wage recipients belong to the 
service sector (Gutiérrez & Schwartz, 1997). As a result, it is logical to expect there to 
be less room for pay “discrimination” among low-wage workers in low-wage 
industries (such as tourism). This is exactly what our empirical findings show. Our 
results also imply that minimum wage legislation may offer stronger protection to 
women working in the tourism industry than equal pay provisions, which require the 
submission of complaints that do not impose actions on employers to ensure equal pay. 
As a result, these provisions may be easily undone by employers. 
Finally, we cannot offer definitive arguments on these points with the data available, 
since we imputed the presence of bias or discrimination from evidence of its effects 
after controlling for observable variables in the data. Certainly, more precise data are 
needed to study wage discrimination—e.g., covert attitudes and policies (such as 
hiring and promotion practices, apart from pay practices). Thus in the current work we 
do not aim to offer, by any means, scientific evidence of bias. In future research we 
plan to find theoretical explanations for these results. This will involve making 
 24 
predictions about the distribution of the wage gap based on different theories of 
discrimination. In turn, this could help us to formulate hypotheses that allow us to test 
which of these different theories is correct. 
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APPENDIX  
TABLE A 
Aggregation of Social Security Contribution Groups into skills levels 
Skills Level Description of corresponding Social Security Contribution Groups 
Qual. 1 1 - engineers and graduates - ingenieros y licenciados 
2 - technical engineers and other skilled workers- ingenieros técnicos, 
peritos y ayudantes titulados 
Qual. 2 3 - chief and departmental heads - jefes administrativos y de taller 
4 - other semi-skilled workers- ayudantes no titulados 
Qual. 3 
5 - skilled clerks - oficiales administrativos 
6 - auxiliary workers- subalternos 
Qual. 4 7 - semi-skilled clerks- auxiliares administrativos 
8 - skilled labourers- oficiales de primera y segunda 
Qual. 5 9 -  semi-skilled labourers - oficiales de tercera y especialistas 
10 - unskilled labourers- peones 
Note: These groups are proxies for workers’ skills level, because these categories are a 
mix of occupation and educational level required for jobs. 
TABLE B 
Description of Work Contract Denominations Used in the Analysis 
 
Work Contract Name Description 
Work-Experience 
(Practice) Contract 
(Contrato de prácticas) 
The purpose of this contract is to enable persons who have 
completed secondary, vocational training or university education 
to gain work experience according to their educational level 
Training Contract 
(Contrato de formación) 
This contract is related to the provision of theoretical and 
practical knowledge required to perform a skilled job. This 
contract replaced the old apprenticeship contract in 1997 
Interim Contract 
(Contrato de interinidad) 
This temporary contract is related to interim situations in the firm 
Per-task Contract 
(Contrato de obra o 
servicio) 
This contract was introduced for firms’ temporary needs related 
to specific work or services of unknown duration (but 
presumably not permanent) 
Casual Contract 
(Contrato eventual por 
circunstancias de la 
producción) 
This contract is related to unusual or seasonal circumstances of 
the goods markets and excess of work in the firm 
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TABLE C. Results of random-effects tobit models, by gender. Non-tourism sub-
sample 
 MEN WOMEN 
 Coeff. Std. Err. Sig. Coeff. Std. Err. Sig. 
Constant 7.028 0.007 *** 7.086 0.016 *** 
Age:       
16-29 -0.117 0.003 *** -0.059 0.005 *** 
30-45 -0.040 0.003 *** -0.004 0.005  
46-65 - - - - - - 
Temporary Help Agency 0.157 0.011 *** 0.164 0.011 *** 
Immigrant -0.002 0.006  0.025 0.012 ** 
Job tenure (months):       
≤ 6 0.034 0.003 *** 0.026 0.005 *** 
>6 & ≤ 12 0.010 0.004 *** 0.006 0.005  
>12 & ≤ 24 0.008 0.003 ** 0.006 0.005  
>24 - - - - - - 
Sub-sector of employment in non-tourism:       
Construction - - - - - - 
Agriculture -0.084 0.025 *** 0.090 0.031 *** 
Mining & industry -0.006 0.006  -0.025 0.015 * 
Retailing -0.059 0.006 *** -0.079 0.014 *** 
Transport & Telecommunications -0.096 0.007 *** 0.054 0.018 *** 
Finance, Estate agencies, R&D & Computing -0.023 0.007 *** -0.040 0.015 *** 
Public administration -0.044 0.017 ** -0.071 0.021 *** 
Teaching -0.213 0.015 *** -0.140 0.020 *** 
Health & Sanitation -0.046 0.016 *** -0.164 0.015 *** 
Associations & Personnel services -0.196 0.012 *** -0.258 0.016 *** 
Domestic service -0.223 0.030 *** -0.196 0.055 *** 
Firm size:       
≤ 25 -0.072 0.004 *** -0.260 0.005 *** 
>25 & ≤ 50 -0.040 0.005 *** -0.176 0.007 *** 
>50 & ≤ 100 -0.003 0.005  -0.120 0.006 *** 
>100 - - - - - - 
Type of contract:       
Open-ended - - - - - - 
Per-task -0.084 0.004 *** -0.062 0.005 *** 
Casual -0.113 0.004 *** -0.077 0.005 *** 
Work experience & training -0.299 0.014 *** -0.241 0.015 *** 
Interim -0.323 0.082 *** -0.774 0.205 *** 
Other temporary -0.140 0.010 *** -0.060 0.008 *** 
Qualification group:       
Qual. 1 0.517 0.006 *** 0.491 0.007 *** 
Qual. 2 0.370 0.005 *** 0.370 0.008 *** 
Qual. 3 0.172 0.005 *** 0.201 0.006 *** 
Qual. 4 0.091 0.003 *** 0.095 0.005 *** 
Qual. 5 - - - - - - 
σu
 
0.204 0.002 *** 0.210 0.002 *** 
σv 0.346 0.001 *** 0.360 0.001 *** 
ρ 0.258 0.003 *** 0.254 0.004 *** 
Log likelihood -62057.667 -37520.626 
n observations 130,850 77,098 
n firms 6,521 5,007 
Likelihood ratio test
a
 
χ
2
(1)= 3.7*10
4
  
Prob≥ χ
2
 = 0.000 
χ
2
(1)= 2.1*10
4 
Prob≥ χ
2
 = 0.000 
a
 Denotes likelihood-ratio test, which provides a test for pooled (tobit) estimator against random-effects 
panel estimator; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Regressions also 
control for years (1998-2003) and regions 
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FIGURE 1. Empirical distribution of monthly wages for tourism temporary workers, 
by gender 
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FIGURE 2. Empirical distribution of monthly wages for non-tourism temporary 
workers, by gender 
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Table 1. Distribution of sub-samples and mean wages, by sex. Tourism sub-sample 
  MEN WOMEN   
  Obs. (%) Mean Std. Dev. Obs. (%) Mean Std. Dev. Raw gap
a
 F/M ratio
b
 
(%) 
Monthly real earnings - 1252.005 602.967 - 1067.096 491.438 184.909 *** 85.231 
16-29 33.960 1122.327 538.7154 39.307 1043.731 469.6672 78.596 *** 92.997 
30-45 47.310 1286.831 610.613 43.302 1087.53 520.1977 199.301 *** 84.512 
Age: 
46-65 18.731 1399.152 646.499 17.391 1069.024 462.7273 330.128  *** 76.405 
No 97.291 1244.232 602.129 96.431 1055.36 483.7082 188.872 *** 84.820 Temporary Help Agency: 
Yes 2.709 1531.222 565.5244 3.569 1384.155 583.966 147.067 *** 90.395 
No 91.879 1263.759 607.2101 92.369 1069.14 489.357 194.619 *** 84.600 Immigrant 
Yes 8.121 1119.015 535.0293 7.631 1042.357 515.3609 76.658 *** 93.150 
Qual. 1 2.762 1907.211 757.8424 1.612 1854.576 735.4805 52.635 ** 97.240 
Qual. 2 8.218 1568.234 633.7099 4.475 1358.067 584.1971 210.167 *** 86.598 
Qual. 3 8.773 1296.263 561.1497 10.764 1240.675 528.4285 55.588 *** 95.712 
Qual. 4 49.982 1306.401 608.9996 35.269 1104.367 461.4706 202.034 *** 84.535 
Qualification group
c
: 
Qual. 5 30.265 1003.686 450.1717 47.880 946.9167 428.5684 56.7693 *** 94.344 
≤ 6 43.003 1203.719 594.8973 49.037 1058.946 508.7036 144.773 *** 87.973 
>6 & ≤ 12 20.083 1272.213 608.0456 19.956 1073.407 493.4824 198.806 *** 84.373 
>12 & ≤ 24 22.497 1314.338 620.1432 19.248 1079.326 464.4748 235.012 *** 82.119 
Job tenure (months): 
>24 & ≤ 36 14.416 1270.618 580.6839 11.759 1070.355 455.7938 200.263 *** 84.239 
≤ 25 53.825 1042.77 471.5143 53.699 988.2396 444.8667 54.5304 *** 94.771 
>25 & ≤ 50 18.389 1254.737 566.2174 17.001 1165.243 529.4422 89.494 *** 92.868 
>50 & ≤ 100 8.475 1259.884 566.2303 11.594 1070.726 492.4561 189.158 *** 84.986 
Firm size (number of employees): 
>100 19.310 1829.164 601.5857 17.706 1209.637 536.161 619.527 *** 66.131 
Open-ended 60.611 1344.195 612.7993 49.491 1128.095 462.416 216.1 *** 83.923 
Per-task 9.836 1178.285 547.0284 11.778 1060.31 471.7333 117.975 *** 89.988 
Casual 22.193 1109.155 538.4497 25.707 1078.919 524.7353 30.236*** 97.274 
Work experience  & Training 0.175 1031.695 467.1652 0.385 1054.225 481.0072 -22.53 102.184 
Interim 1.735 1495.931 617.1846 2.225 1267.978 586.142 227.953 *** 84.762 
Type of contract: 
Other temporary 5.449 870.8341 541.1471 10.412 713.1886 371.1715 157.6455 *** 81.897 
Hotels 43.625 1187.421 531.3452 49.891 1078.817 489.0059 108.604 *** 90.854 
Camping sites & other commercial  
accommodation 23.976 1013.054 436.946 33.667 947.3209 398.0225 65.7331*** 93.511 
Restaurants 24.487 1583.987 710.359 6.225 1455.229 626.3566 128.758 *** 91.871 
Transport, Car hire, Travel agencies, 
tour operators & tour guides 3.245 1494.597 617.9301 5.224 1251.704 490.6467 242.893 *** 83.749 
Sub-sector in tourism: 
Recreational, cultural & sporting 
facilities 4.668 1172.768 547.4716 4.994 1080.541 562.9261 92.227 *** 92.136 
 a “Raw gap” is difference in mean monthly wages between sexes; b “F/M ratio” is mean female monthly wages/mean male monthly wages; c See Table A in Appendix for categories inside each 
qualification level. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 33 
Table 2. Distribution of sub-samples and mean wages, by sex. Non-tourism sub-sample 
  MEN WOMEN   
  Obs. (%) Mean Std. Dev. Obs. (%) Mean Std. Dev. Raw gap
a
 F/M ratio
b
 
(%) 
Monthly real earnings - 1404.383 631.2661 - 1211.815 587.123 192.568 *** 86.288 
16-29 36.833 1251.225 555.888 44.353 1130.886 525.723 120.339 *** 90.382 
30-45 44.289 1476.363 648.487 43.289 1312.568 632.227 163.795 *** 88.906 
Age: 
46-65 18.878 1534.342 668.288 12.358 1149.341 578.273 385.001 *** 74.908 
No 93.723 1388.544 625.207 84.198 1141.941 551.958 246.603 *** 82.240 Temporary Help Agency: 
Yes 6.277 1640.903 672.709 15.802 1584.126 627.332 56.777 *** 96.540 
No 96.945 1408.865 631.872 98.184 1211.485 586.156 197.380 *** 85.990 Immigrant 
Yes 3.055 1262.163 594.497 1.816 1229.651 637.212 32.512 * 97.424 
Qual. 1 7.635 2091.142 680.292 12.138 1819.91 654.2479 271.232 *** 87.029 
Qual. 2 6.355 1928.249 705.904 4.529 1667.14 722.8482 261.109 *** 86.459 
Qual. 3 11.564 1437.282 602.146 19.907 1252.758 518.3571 184.524 *** 87.162 
Qual. 4 39.606 1352.912 563.041 30.570 1119.864 479.729 233.048 *** 82.774 
Qualification group
c
: 
Qual. 5 34.840 1205.918 524.030 32.856 985.1463 465.4992 220.772 *** 81.693 
≤ 6 38.085 1388.575 659.695 37.509 1231.357 641.476 157.218 *** 88.678 
>6 & ≤ 12 16.921 1322.790 571.424 19.190 1153.873 541.715 168.917 *** 87.230 
>12 & ≤ 24 28.238 1447.604 623.665 26.824 1225.062 554.220 222.542 *** 84.627 
Job tenure (months): 
>24 & ≤ 36 16.756 1449.873 625.603 16.476 1213.245 555.467 236.628 *** 83.679 
≤ 25 38.728 1196.977 536.454 29.460 1018.557 496.681 178.420 *** 85.094 
>25 & ≤ 50 14.138 1340.448 581.793 9.452 1180.090 562.863 160.358 *** 88.037 
>50 & ≤ 100 12.115 1472.658 634.550 10.453 1254.829 590.741 217.829 *** 85.208 
Firm size (number of employees):
>100 35.019 1635.945 662.791 50.636 1321.295 609.763 314.650 *** 80.766 
Open-ended 51.885 1525.691 652.685 52.112 1217.803 552.1348 307.888 *** 79.820 
Per-task 29.975 1266.824 539.059 13.628 1195.441 571.5208 71.383 *** 94.365 
Casual 11.557 1210.326 573.035 13.016 1077.202 548.9154 133.124 *** 89.001 
Work experience  & Training 0.637 1225.572 620.453 1.169 1149.498 560.4664 76.074 *** 93.793 
Interim 3.583 1706.051 638.754 12.169 1529.096 638.4124 176.955 *** 89.628 
Type of contract: 
Other temporary 2.363 1025.672 677.493 7.907 943.0722 599.8682 82.600 *** 91.947 
Construction 30.516 1341.012 574.730 2.411 1251.139 534.033 89.873 * 93.298 
Agriculture 0.258 1835.530 823.098 0.305 1725.856 773.2552 109.674 *** 94.025 
Mining & industry 24.680 1484.726 637.641 16.845 1235.303 580.5483 249.423 *** 83.201 
Retailing 18.831 1339.857 611.389 30.230 1099.682 500.4993 240.175 *** 82.075 
Transport & Telecommunications 5.828 1291.973 578.453 1.977 1294.263 587.4463 -2.290 100.177 
Finance, Estate agencies, R&D & Computing 9.995 1466.984 736.836 18.930 1151.871 604.7548 315.113 *** 78.520 
Public administration 4.164 1745.056 642.560 9.803 1630.02 592.0019 115.036 *** 93.408 
Teaching 1.415 1459.626 621.525 3.593 1316.485 626.5023 143.141 *** 90.193 
Health & Sanitation 1.927 1418.982 643.529 10.424 1268.906 604.336 150.076 *** 89.424 
Associations & Personnel services 2.147 1237.500 665.950 5.343 965.0684 509.7963 272.432 *** 77.985 
Sub-sector in non-tourism: 
Domestic service 0.238 1059.253 379.528 0.139 936.7841 465.41 122.469 *** 88.438 
a “Raw gap” is difference in mean monthly wages between sexes; b “F/M ratio” is mean female monthly wages/mean male monthly wages; c See Table A in Appendix for categories inside each 
qualification level. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
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Table 3. Results of random-effects tobit models, by gender. Tourism sub-sample 
 MEN WOMEN 
 Coeff. Std. Err. Sig. Coeff. Std. Err. Sig. 
Constant 6.926 0.018 *** 6.734 0.017 *** 
Age:       
16-29 -0.092 0.005 *** -0.041 0.005 *** 
30-45 -0.042 0.004 *** -0.023 0.005 *** 
46-65 - - - - - - 
Temporary Help Agency 0.263 0.015 *** 0.025 0.015 * 
Immigrant -0.007 0.005  -0.019 0.007 *** 
Job tenure (months):       
≤ 6 -0.009 0.005 * -0.005 0.006  
>6 & ≤ 12 0.000 0.005  0.006 0.006  
>12 & ≤ 24 0.010 0.005 ** 0.008 0.006  
>24 - - - - - - 
Sub-sector of employment in tourism:       
Hotels 0.095 0.008 *** 0.185 0.009 *** 
Camping sites & other commercial accommodation 0.159 0.008 *** 0.101 0.009 *** 
Restaurants 0.022 0.008 *** 0.125 0.011 *** 
Transport, Car hire, Travel agencies,  tour operators 
& tour guides 0.022 0.007 *** 0.299 0.010 *** 
Recreational, cultural & sporting facilities - - - - - - 
Firm size:       
≤ 25 -0.238 0.015 *** -0.210 0.011 *** 
>25 & ≤ 50 -0.182 0.015 *** -0.160 0.011 *** 
>50 & ≤ 100 -0.094 0.015 *** -0.133 0.012 *** 
>100 - - - - - - 
Type of contract:       
Open-ended - - - - - - 
Per-task -0.053 0.005 *** -0.007 0.007  
Casual -0.041 0.004 *** -0.047 0.005 *** 
Work experience & training -0.075 0.032 ** -0.187 0.025 *** 
Interim 0.042 0.013 *** 0.048 0.012 *** 
Other temporary -0.483 0.009 *** -0.591 0.008 *** 
Qualification group:       
Qual. 1 0.446 0.010 *** 0.488 0.015 *** 
Qual. 2 0.251 0.006 *** 0.245 0.009 *** 
Qual. 3 0.113 0.007 *** 0.168 0.006 *** 
Qual. 4 0.071 0.004 *** 0.064 0.004 *** 
Qual. 5 - - - - - - 
σu
 
0.182 0.002 *** 0.185 0.002 *** 
σv 0.357 0.001 *** 0.380 0.001 *** 
ρ 0.206 0.003 *** 0.192 0.004 *** 
Log likelihood -43529.334 -40228.811 
n observations 95,767 77,379 
n firms 1,016 953 
Likelihood ratio test
a
 
χ
2
(1)= 3.3*10
4
  
Prob≥ χ
2
 = 0.000 
χ
2
(1)= 1.7*10
4 
Prob≥ χ
2
 = 0.000 
a
 Denotes likelihood-ratio test, which provides a test for pooled (tobit) estimator against random-effects 
panel estimator 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Regressions also control for years 
(1998-2003) and regions 
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Table 4. Decompositions of gender wage difference between men and women (in logarithms) 
Method 
Reimers Oaxaca-1 Oaxaca-2 
 
 
TOURISM WORKERS Value % of total % of subtotal Value % of total % of subtotal Value % of total % of subtotal 
Total gender wage differential 0.065 100  0.065 100  0.065 100  
Unexplained  0.007 11.954  0.035 53.084  -0.019 -29.176  
Explained  0.058 88.046 100.000 0.031 46.916 100 0.084 129.176 100.000 
Explained by:          
Age  0.002 3.474 3.946 0.003 5.013 10.684 0.001 1.935 1.498 
THA  -0.001 -1.896 -2.153 -0.002 -3.462 -7.380 0.000 -0.329 -0.255 
Immigrant 0.000 -0.095 -0.108 0.000 -0.049 -0.105 0.000 -0.141 -0.109 
Job tenure  0.001 1.108 1.258 0.001 1.294 2.758 0.001 0.922 0.713 
Sub-sector  0.010 15.712 17.845 -0.005 -7.213 -15.375 0.025 38.636 29.910 
Firm size  0.001 1.355 1.538 0.000 0.158 0.336 0.002 2.551 1.975 
Type of contract  0.029 44.095 50.082 0.026 40.377 86.062 0.031 47.814 37.014 
Year  0.003 3.912 4.443 0.003 3.900 8.313 0.003 3.923 3.037 
Region  -0.008 -12.854 -14.599 -0.018 -27.778 -59.208 0.001 2.071 1.603 
Qualification  0.022 33.235 37.748 0.023 34.677 73.914 0.021 31.793 24.613 
NON-TOURISM WORKERS    
Total gender wage differential 0.047 100  0.047 100  0.047 100  
Unexplained  0.041 87.494  0.041 86.907  0.042 88.081  
Explained  0.006 12.506 100.000 0.006 13.093 100 0.006 11.919 100.000 
Explained by:          
Age  0.006 13.535 108.231 0.008 17.736 135.460 0.004 9.335 78.319 
THA  -0.015 -32.309 -258.344 -0.015 -31.553 -240.986 -0.016 -33.065 -277.412 
Immigrant  0.000 0.300 2.403 0.000 -0.044 -0.339 0.000 0.645 5.415 
Job tenure  0.000 0.204 1.629 0.000 0.178 1.357 0.000 0.230 1.928 
Sub-sector  0.032 67.007 535.794 0.022 45.976 351.146 0.042 88.038 738.633 
Firm size  -0.021 -45.376 -362.829 -0.009 -18.108 -138.302 -0.034 -72.643 -609.476 
Type of contract  0.031 65.377 522.759 0.032 67.227 513.451 0.030 63.526 532.984 
Year  0.002 4.392 35.121 0.002 4.119 31.457 0.002 4.666 39.146 
Region  -0.006 -11.781 -94.202 -0.012 -24.505 -187.161 0.000 0.943 7.915 
Qualification  -0.023 -48.844 -390.562 -0.023 -47.932 -366.084 -0.024 -49.756 -417.453 
 
 
